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Abstract—In this paper, we present a new BFT consensus 
mechanism which enables thousands of nodes to participate in 
the consensus process, and supports very high transaction 
throughput. This is achieved via an aggregated signature gossip 
protocol which can significantly reduce the messaging 
complexity and thus allows a large number of nodes to reach 
consensus quickly. The proposed aggregated signature gossip 
protocol leverages a non-interactive leaderless BLS signature 
aggregation scheme. We have proven the correctness of the 
protocol, and analyzed its efficiency. In our analysis, each node 
only needs to send and receive O(logn) messages to reach 
agreement, where each message just contains a couple kilobytes 
of data. 
Keywords — scalable BFT consensus, decentralization, high 
throughput, aggregated signature gossip 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For the blockchain technology to enter the mainstream, 
many technical challenges need to be tackled. These 
challenges include supporting high transaction throughput and 
fast confirmation time while maintaining a high level of 
decentralization.  
Recent proposals like the Delegated Proof-of-Stake 
(DPoS) mechanism offers much higher throughput over 
Proof-of-Work chains like Bitcoin [1] and Ethereum [2]. 
However, they typically only permit a limited number of 
validator nodes [3, 4]. This sacrifices the level of 
decentralization and transaction security. Ideally, a Proof-of-
Stake (PoS) based consensus mechanism should allow 
thousands of independent nodes, each with similar amounts of 
stake, to participate in the consensus process. To compromise 
such a system, an adversary needs to control a significant 
fraction of independent nodes, which is difficult to achieve.  
In this paper we propose a novel multi-level BFT 
consensus mechanism that allows thousands of consensus 
participants, and yet can achieve high transaction throughput 
(1000+ TPS). The core idea is to have a small set of nodes, 
which forms the validator committee, to produce a chain of 
blocks as fast as possible using a PBFT-like process [5]. With 
a sufficient number of validators (e.g. 10 to 20), the committee 
can produce blocks at a fast speed, and it is already difficult 
enough for an adversary to compromise. Hence, it is 
reasonable to expect that they will produce a chain of blocks 
without forks with high probability. Then, all the thousand 
consensus participants, called the guardians, can finalize the 
chain generated by the validator committee. Here, finalization 
means to convince each honest guardian that more than 2/3 of 
all the other guardians possess the same chain of blocks.  
Since there are many more guardians than validators, it 
could take longer time for the guardians to reach consensus 
than the validator committee. In order for the guardians to 
finalize the chain of blocks at the same speed as the validator 
committee produces new blocks, the guardian nodes can 
finalize the blocks at a coarser grain. To be more specific, they 
only need to agree on the hash of the checkpoint blocks, i.e. 
blocks whose heights are multiples of some integer T (e.g. T = 
100). This “leapfrogging” finalization strategy leverages the 
immutability characteristic of the blockchain data structure — 
as long as two guardian nodes agree on the hash of a block, 
with overwhelming probability, they will have exactly the 
same copy of the entire blockchain up to that block. Finalizing 
only the checkpoint blocks gives sufficient time for the 
thousands of guardians to reach consensus. Hence, with this 
strategy, the two independent processes, i.e., block production 
and finalization, can advance at the same pace.  
Even though block finalization is only performed every T 
blocks, we need to find a way to efficiently convince every 
honest guardian that indeed more than 2/3 of all guardians 
have the same checkpoint hash. A naive all-to-all broadcasting 
of the checkpoint block hash could work. However, it yields 
quadratic communication overhead, and so cannot scale to a 
large number of guardians. Instead we propose an aggregated 
signature gossip scheme which could significantly reduce the 
messaging complexity. The core idea is rather simple. Each 
guardian node keeps combining the partially aggregated 
signatures from all its neighbors, and then gossips out this 
aggregated signature, along with a compact bitmap which 
encodes the list of signers. This way the signature share of 
each node can reach other nodes with exponential speed 
thanks to the gossip protocol. Within O(logn) iterations, with 
high probability, all the honest guardian nodes should have 
aggregated the signatures from all other honest nodes if there 
is no network partition. Such fast convergence would allow us 
to choose a relatively small T which translates into short block 
finalization time (in the order of minutes in practice). 
The above is a high-level description of our proposal. We 
are actively implementing the proposed protocol in the Theta 
Ledger, a full-fledged blockchain designed for the video 
streaming industry. We have released our implementation on 
GitHub1. 
In the next section, we will first review the related works. 
Then, in Section III, we present the details and analysis of the 
multi-level BFT consensus protocol. Section IV provides 
experimental results which demonstrate the practicality of the 
proposed mechanism. Section V summarizes the paper with 
concluding remarks. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
In recent years there have been many proposals that 
attempt to overcome the performance hurdle of the Proof-of-
Work consensus. The Delegated Proof-of-Stake approach 
achieves high throughput, but at the expense of 
decentralization [3]. Algorand and DFINITY achieve a better 
level of decentralization by introducing a rotating set of 
committees selected at random to produce new blocks [6, 7]. 
However, both techniques lack a mechanism to allow other 
nodes to approve the block produced by the committee. 
Although unlikely, the random selection process could happen 
to elect a committee with more than two-third malicious 
 
1 https://github.com/thetatoken/theta-protocol-ledger 
nodes. In such cases, the resulting blockchain might contain 
invalid blocks. 
On a different track, there have been lines of work from 
Bitcoin-NG [13] to recent proposals like ByzCoin and 
OmniLedger [14, 16], that allow many nodes to jointly finalize 
new blocks. They employ a single leader to produce blocks in 
order to achieve high throughput, with a number of nodes 
validating the blocks afterwards. While bearing some 
similarities, in our approach we use a validator committee 
instead of a single leader, which significantly enhances  
security while maintaining high throughput. Furthermore, our 
guardian network leverages a BLS based signature 
aggregation scheme to reach agreement in a leaderless 
fashion. Compared to the Schnorr signature based CoSi 
scheme [15] employed by ByzCoin and OmniLedger, our 
approach is simpler to implement thanks to the non-interactive 
nature of the BLS signature aggregation. Moreover, the 
leaderless nature of our signature aggregation scheme could 
be much more robust in the presence of byzantine nodes 
compared to CoSi, which requires a leader to orchestrate all 
the nodes to produce the aggregate signatures. We will 
provide more in-depth comparison in the Remarks section. 
We also note that the signature aggregation and the related 
threshold signature techniques have seen wide applications in 
blockchain research. For instance, they have been employed 
by researchers to construct random beacons, to achieve better 
censorship resilience, and to reduce storage costs [7, 18-20]. 
III. THE MULTI-BFT CONSENSUS MECHANISM 
A. Validators and Guardians 
As mentioned in the introduction section, the validator 
committee is comprised of a limited set of validator nodes, 
typically in the range of ten to twenty. They can be selected 
through an EOS-like election process [3], or a randomized 
process. The committee may be subject to rotation to improve 
security, for instance using techniques like the “cryptographic 
sortition” method from Algorand [6], or the “threshold relay” 
mechanism from DFINITY [7]. To be eligible to join the 
validator committee, a node needs to lock up a certain amount 
of stake for a period of time. The locked stake could be slashed 
if malicious behavior is detected. The blocks that the 
committee reaches consensus on are called settled blocks, and 
the process by which they produce a chain of block is called 
the block settlement process. 
The guardian network is a super set of the validator 
committee, i.e. a validator is also a guardian. The guardian 
network contains a large number of nodes, which could be in 
the range of thousands. With a certain amount of token lockup 
for a period of time, any node in the network can instantly 
become a guardian. The guardians download and examine the 
chain of blocks generated by the validator committee and try 
to reach consensus on the checkpoints. By allowing mass 
participation, we can greatly enhance transaction security. The 
blocks that the guardian network has reached consensus on are 
called finalized blocks, and the process by which they finalize 
the chain of blocks is called the block finalization process. 
The name multi-level BFT consensus mechanism reflects 
the fact that the validator/guardian division provides multiple 
levels of security guarantee. The validator committee provides 
the first level of protection — with 10 to 20 validators, the 
committee can come to consensus at a fast pace. Yet it is 
resistant enough to attacks — in fact, it already provides a 
similar level of security compared to the DPoS mechanism. 
Thus, a transaction can already be considered safe when it has 
been included in a settled block, especially for low stake 
transactions, which are the most common transactions. The 
guardian network forms the second line of defense. With 
thousands of nodes, it is substantially more difficult for 
attackers to compromise, thus this provides a much higher 
level of security. A transaction is considered irreversible only 
when it is included in a finalized block. In the unlikely event 
that the validator committee is fully controlled by attackers, 
the guardians can re-elect the validators, and the blockchain 
can restart advancing from the latest block finalized by the 
guardians. To be more specific, the newly elected validator 
committee will start proposing and settling new blocks from 
the latest guardian-finalized block (those settled but not yet 
finalized blocks are discarded). And the guardians then follow 
the block finalization process described later in the paper to 
finalize the new blocks settled by the validator committee. We 
believe this mechanism can achieve a good balance among the 
level of decentralization, transaction throughput, and 
consistency, the three corners of the so-called “impossible 
triangle”. 
B. System Model 
Before diving into the details of the block settlement and 
finalization process, we first list our assumptions of the 
system. For ease of discussion, below we assume each node 
(be it a validator or a guardian) has the same amount of stake. 
Extending the algorithms to the general case where different 
nodes have different amounts of stake is straightforward. 
Validator committee failure model: There are m 
validator nodes in total. Most of the time, at most 1/3 of them 
are byzantine nodes. They might be fully controlled by 
attackers, but we assume this happens only rarely. We also 
assume that between any pair of validators there is a direct 
message channel (e.g. a direct TCP socket connection). 
Guardian network failure model: There are n guardian 
nodes in total. At any moment, at most 1/3 of them are 
byzantine nodes. We do not assume a direct message channel 
between any two guardians. Messages between them might 
need to be routed through other nodes, some of which could 
be byzantine nodes. 
Timing model: We assume the “weak synchrony” model. 
To be more specific, the network can be asynchronous, or 
even partitioned for a bounded period of time. Between the 
asynchronous periods there is a sufficient amount of time 
where all message transmissions between two directly 
connected honest nodes arrive within a known time bound. As 
we will discuss later in the paper, during the asynchronous 
period, the system simply stops finalizing new blocks. It 
would never produce conflicting blocks even during 
asynchrony periods. During the synchronous phase, block 
production will naturally resume, and eventual liveness can be 
achieved. 
Attacker model: We assume powerful attackers. They 
can corrupt a large number of targeted nodes, but no more than 
1/3 of all the guardians simultaneously. They can manipulate 
the network at a large scale, and can even partition the network 
but only for a bounded period of time. However, they are 
computationally bounded. For instance, they cannot forge 
fake signatures, and cannot invert cryptographic hashes. 
C. The Block Settlement Process 
Block settlement is the process by which the validator 
committee reaches agreement and produces a chain of blocks 
for the guardian network to finalize. Various PBFT based 
blockchain consensus algorithms including the EOS DPoS-
BFT, Tendermint, Casper FFG, Hot-Stuff, Algorand, and 
DFINITY [3, 4, 6-9] can be employed for the validator 
committee to produce and settle on a chain of blocks. We will 
omit the details of these algorithm here. But it is worth 
pointing out that these algorithms guarantee safety when less 
than 1/3 of the validators have byzantine failures. Liveness 
can be achieved during the synchronous periods. When the 
network is partitioned, the validator committee stops 
generating new blocks, which is desirable since it avoids split-
brain. However, after the network recovers, the validator 
committee can continue to produce new blocks. With ten to 
twenty validators, the committee can produce blocks with fast 
speed, enabling 1000+ transactions per second throughput. 
Meanwhile, if these validators are run by different entities, it 
is already reasonably difficult for an attacker to gain full 
control of the committee. Thus, the guardians can expect that 
the validator committee can produce a chain of blocks without 
forks most of the time. 
D. The Block Finalization Process 
As the validator committee adds new blocks to the 
blockchain, the guardian network finalizes the produced chain 
in parallel. As mentioned earlier, to finalize the chain of blocks 
generated by the validator committee, the guardians only need 
to reach consensus on the hashes of the checkpoint blocks, 
which are the blocks whose heights are multiple of some 
integer T (e.g. T = 100). 
To see why it is sufficient to finalize just the checkpoint 
blocks, we note that the transaction execution engine of the 
blockchain software can be viewed as a “deterministic state 
machine”, whereas a transaction can be viewed as a 
deterministic state transfer function. If two nodes run the same 
state machine, then from an identical initial state, after 
executing the same sequence of transactions, they will reach 
an identical end state. Note that this is true even when some of 
the transactions are invalid, as long as those transactions can 
be detected by the state machine and skipped. For example, 
assume a transaction tries to spend more tokens than the 
balance of the source account. The state machine can simply 
skip this transaction after performing the sanity check. This 
way the “bad” transactions have no impact on the final state. 
In the context of blockchain, if all the honest nodes have 
the same copy of the blockchain, they can be ensured to arrive 
at the same end state after processing all the blocks in order. 
But with one caveat — the blockchain might contain a huge 
amount of data. How can two honest nodes compare whether 
they have the same chain of blocks efficiently? 
Here the immutability characteristic of the blockchain data 
structure becomes highly relevant. Since the header of each 
block contains the hash of the previous block, as long as two 
nodes have the same hash of a checkpoint block, with 
overwhelming probability, they should have an identical chain 
of blocks from the genesis up to that checkpoint. Of course 
each of the guardian nodes needs to verify the integrity of the 
blockchain. In particular, they need to verify that the block 
hash embedded in each block header is actually the hash of the 
previous block. We note that a node can perform the integrity 
check on its own; no communication with other nodes is 
required.  
Interestingly, the immutability characteristic also 
enhances the tolerance to network asynchrony or even 
partition. With network partition, the guardians may not be 
able to reach consensus on the hash of a checkpoint. However, 
after the network is recovered, they can move on to vote on 
the next checkpoint. If they can then reach agreement, all the 
blocks up to the next checkpoint are considered finalized, 
regardless of whether or not they have consensus on the prior 
checkpoints. 
To provide byzantine fault tolerance, an honest node needs 
to be assured that more than 2/3 of the guardians has the same 
checkpoint block hash. Hence it needs to receive signatures 
for a checkpoint hash from more than 2/3 of all guardians 
before the node can mark that checkpoint as finalized. This is 
to ensure safety, which is similar to the “commit” step in the 
PBFT protocol. 
Since the guardians only need to vote on checkpoint 
hashes every T blocks, they have more time to reach 
consensus. A straightforward implementation of checkpoint 
finalization is thus to follow the PBFT “commit” step where 
each guardian broadcasts its signature of the checkpoint hash 
to all other guardians. This requires each node to send, receive 
and process O(n) messages, where each message can be a 
couple kilobytes long. Even with T blocks time, this approach 
still cannot scale beyond a couple hundred guardian nodes, 
unless we select a large T value, which is undesirable since it 
increases the block finalization latency. 
E. Scale to Thousands of Guardian Nodes 
To reduce the communication complexity in order to scale 
to thousands of guardian nodes, we have designed an 
aggregated signature gossip protocol inspired by the BLS 
signature aggregation scheme [10, 11] and the gossip protocol. 
The protocol requires each guardian node to process a much 
smaller number of messages to reach consensus. Below are 
the steps of the aggregated signature gossip protocol. It uses 
the BLS algorithm for signature aggregation. 
The core idea is rather simple. Each guardian node keeps 
combining the partially aggregated signatures from its 
neighbors, and then gossips out the newly aggregated 
signature. This way the signature share of each node can reach 
other nodes at an exponential speed thanks to the gossip 
protocol. On the other hand, the signature aggregation keeps 
the size of the messages small. 
Algorithm 1 provides the pseudo code of the protocol. 
Here i is the index of the current guardian node. The first line 
of the protocol uses function SignBLS() to generate its initial 
aggregated signature 𝜎푖. It essentially signs a message which 
is the concatenation of the height and hash of the checkpoint 
block using the BLS signature algorithm: ℎ푖 ← 𝐻 𝑝𝑘푖, ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡푐푝||ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ푐푝                (1) 𝜎푖 ← ℎ푖푠푘푖                                (2) 
In the first formula above, function 𝐻 ∶ 𝐺 × 0, 1 ∗ →𝐺 is a hash function that takes both the public key pki and the 
message as input. This is to prevent the rogue public-key 
attack [12]. Here G is a multiplicative cyclic group of prime 
order p with generator g. 
The protocol also uses function InitSignerVector() to 
initialize the signer vector 𝑐푖 , which is an n dimensional 
integer vector whose uth entry represents how many times the 
uth guardian has signed the aggregated signature. After 
initialization, its ith entry is set to 1, and the remaining entries 
are all set to 0. 
After the initialization, the guardian enters a loop. In each 
iteration, the guardian first sends out its current aggregated 
signature 𝜎푖 and signer vector 𝑐푖 to all its neighbors. Then, if 
it has not considered the checkpoint as finalized, it waits for 
the signatures and signer vectors from all its neighbors, or 
waits until timeout. Upon receiving all the signature and 
signer vectors, it checks the validity of 𝜎푗, 𝑐푗  received from 
neighboring node j using the BLS aggregated signature 
verification algorithm. ℎ푢 ← 𝐻 𝑝𝑘푢, ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡푐푝||ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ푐푝                (3) 
check if  𝑒 𝜎푗, 𝑔 = 𝑒 ℎ푢, 𝑝𝑘푢 푐푗푢푛푢         (4) 
where 𝑐푗푢 is the uth entry of vector 𝑐푗, and 𝑒 ∶ 𝐺×𝐺 → 𝐺푇  is 
a bilinear mapping function from 𝐺×𝐺  to 𝐺푇 , another 
multiplicative cyclic group also of prime order p. To guard 
against byzantine nodes, all the invalid signatures and their 
associated signer vectors are discarded for the next 
aggregation step. It is worth pointing out that besides ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡푐푝  and ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ푐푝 , the above check also requires the 
public key 𝑝𝑘푢 of the relevant guardians as input. All these 
information should be available locally, since when a guardian 
locks up its stakes, its public key should be attached to the 
stake locking transaction which is already written into the 
blockchain. Hence, no communication with other nodes is 
necessary to retrieve these inputs. 
The aggregation step aggregates the BLS signature 𝜎푗, and 
updates the signer vector  𝑐푗 from the neighbors. Note that for 
the vector update, we take mod 𝑝 for each entry. We can do 
this because 𝑒 ℎ푢, 𝑝𝑘푢 ∈ 𝐺푇 , which is a multiplicative 
cyclic group of prime order p. This guarantees that vector  𝑐푗 
can always be represented with a bounded number of bits. 𝜎푖 ← 𝜎푖 ⋅ 𝜎푗푗 , 𝑐푖 ← 𝑐푖 + 𝑐푗푗 mod 𝑝     (5) 
The algorithm then calculates the number of unique 
signers of the aggregated signature for node i. 𝑠 ← 𝐼 𝑐푖푢 > 0푛푢=1                      (6) 
Here ciu is the uth entry of vector  𝑐푖 . Function 𝐼 : true, false → {1, 0}  maps a true condition to 1, and 
false to 0. Condition 𝑐푖푢 > 0 indicates that node u has signed 
the aggregated signature that node i currently possesses at 
least once. Hence the summation counts how many unique 
signers have contributed to the aggregated signature. If the 
signature is signed by more than 2/3 of all the guardians, the 
guardian can consider the checkpoint as finalized. 
If the checkpoint is finalized, the aggregated signature will 
be gossiped out in the next iteration. After this gossip, within 
O(log(n)) iterations all the honest guardians will have an 
aggregated signature signed by more than 2/3 of all the 
guardians if the network is not partitioned. The for-loop has L 
iterations, L should be in the order of O(log(n)) to allow the 
signature to propagate through the network. 
F. Analysis 
1) Finalization Safety and Liveness Analysis 
a) Safety  
Safety of the block finalization is easy to prove. Under the 
2/3 supermajority honesty assumption, if two checkpoint 
hashes for the same height both have signatures from more 
than 2/3 of the guardians, then by the pigeonhole principle, 
more than 1/3 of the guardians must have signed both. Given 
that more than 2/3 of the guardians are honest, this implies at 
least one honest guardian signed both, which implies they are 
the same checkpoint hash. 
b) Liveness  
Without network partition, as long as L is large enough, it 
is highly likely that after O(log(n)) iteration, all the honest 
nodes will see an aggregated signature that combines the 
signatures of all honest signers. This is similar to how the 
gossip protocol can robustly spread a message throughout the 
network in O(log(n)) time, even with up to 1/3 byzantine 
nodes. When there is network partition, consensus for a 
checkpoint may not be able to be reached. However, after the 
network partition is over, the guardian network can proceed to 
Algorithm 1. The aggregated signature gossip protocol 
finalize the next checkpoint block. If consensus can then be 
reached, all the blocks up to the next checkpoint are 
considered finalized. Hence the finalization process will 
progress eventually. 
Note that the above analysis only covers the safety and 
liveness property of the block finalization process. The 
analysis for the block settle process is omitted in this paper 
due to page limit. Please refer to the Theta Technical 
Whitepaper for the full analysis [17]. 
2) Aggregated Signature Gossip Protocol Analysis 
a) Correctness of the Protocol 
To prove the correctness of the aggregated signature 
gossip protocol, we need to prove two claims. First, if an 
aggregated signature is correctly formed by honest nodes 
according to Algorithm 1, it can pass the check given by 
Formula (4). Second, the aggregated signature is secure 
against forgery. 
To prove the first claim, we note that both group G and 
GT are cyclic groups. A cyclic group is always an abelian 
group, and hence we can switch the order of elements in 
multiplications. Furthermore, since group GT has a prime 
order p, given a group element 𝑣 ∈  𝐺푇 , for any integer c, 𝑣푐 = 𝑣푐 mod 푝. With these properties, it is straightforward to 
prove the first claim using the definition of bilinear mapping. 
In the proof below, Nb denotes the set of neighboring nodes 
of node j, 𝜎푗푘 is the partially aggregated signature collected 
from neighbor node k in the current iteration, and u is the 
signature of node u given by Formula (2). 𝑒 𝜎푗, 𝑔 = 𝑒 𝜎푗푘푘∈푁푏 , 𝑔 = 𝑒 𝜎푗푘, 𝑔푘∈푁푏  = 𝑒 𝜎푢, 𝑔 푐푗푢푛푢=1 = 𝑒 ℎ푢푠푘푢 , 𝑔 푐푗푢푛푢=1  = 𝑒 ℎ푢, 𝑔푠푘푢 푐푗푢푛푢=1 = 𝑒 ℎ푢, 𝑝𝑘푢 푐푗푢푛푢=1  
Now let us prove the second claim regarding the 
unforgeability of the aggregated signature. To prove this 
claim, we will show that signature forgery can be reduced to 
the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem [10, 11]. 
Stated more formally, we will prove that for randomly chosen 𝑝𝑘1 = 𝑔푠푘1 , … , 𝑝𝑘푛 = 𝑔푠푘푛 ∈ 𝐺 , and random message 
hashes ℎ1, … , ℎ푛 ∈ 𝐺, finding 𝜎 ∈ 𝐺 and integers c1, c2, …, 
cn which satisfy the equation below is as hard as solving the 
CDH problem. 𝑒 𝜎, 𝑔 = 𝑒 ℎ푢, 𝑝𝑘푢 푐푢푛푢=1  
Let us first look at a special case where n = 1, i.e., there is 
only one guardian node. In this case, for the adversary, forging 
a single guardian’s aggregated signature means to find 𝜎 ∈ 𝐺 
and an integer c that satisfies 𝑒 𝜎, 𝑔 = 𝑒 ℎ, 𝑝𝑘 푐                       (7) 
Note that 𝑒 ℎ, 𝑝𝑘 푐 = 𝑒 ℎ푐, 𝑝𝑘 = 𝑒 ℎ푐, 𝑔푠푘 = 𝑒 ℎ푠푘⋅푐, 𝑔  
We thus have 𝜎 = ℎ푠푘 푐 
Next, using the Extended Euclidean algorithm, in 
polynomial time we can find an integer d such that 𝑐 ⋅ 𝑑 ≡ 1 mod 𝑝, where p is the order of G, which is a prime number. 
Thus 𝜎푑 = ℎ푠푘 푐⋅푑 = ℎ푠푘 푐⋅푑 mod 푝 = ℎ푠푘 
which means that the adversary can compute hsk from g, gsk, 
and h in polynomial time using 𝜎 and c. This indicates that 
finding 𝜎 ∈ 𝐺 and integer c satisfying equation (7) is as hard 
as the CDH problem. 
When there are n > 1 guardian nodes, signature forgery 
means that the adversary must find 𝜎 ∈ 𝐺, and integers c1, c2, 
…, cn that satisfies the equation below 𝑒 𝜎, 𝑔 = 𝑒 ℎ푢, 𝑝𝑘푢 푐푢푛푢=1                (8) 
Again, we show this is equivalent to solving the CDH 
problem. To see why, for randomly chosen 𝑔, 𝑔푠푘1  and ℎ1  , 
the adversary can randomly generate 𝑛 − 1  key pairs 𝑠𝑘2, 𝑝𝑘2 , … 𝑠𝑘푛, 𝑝𝑘푛 , where 𝑝𝑘푢  = 𝑔푠푘푢  for u = 2, 3, 
…, n. He then plugs these values into Equation (8), and solves 
for 𝜎 ∈ 𝐺 and integers c1, c2, …, cn. Note that 𝑒 𝜎, 𝑔 = 𝑒 ℎ푢, 𝑝𝑘푢 푐푢푛푢=1  = 𝑒 ℎ푢푠푘푢 푐푢 , 𝑔푛푢=1  = 𝑒 ℎ푢푠푘푢 푐푢푛푢=1 , 𝑔  
This means 𝜎 = ℎ푢푠푘푢 푐푢푛푢=1                       (9) 
Since the adversary knows sk2, …, skn, he can plug these 
private keys into Equation (9), which then gives ℎ1푠푘1 푐1 = 𝜎 ⋅ ℎ푢푠푘푢 푐푢푛푢=2 −1 = 𝜎 ⋅ ℎ푢−푠푘푢⋅푐푢푛푢=2  
Similar to the reasoning for n = 1, in polynomial time we 
can find an integer d1 such that 𝑐1 ⋅ 𝑑1  ≡  1 mod 𝑝. Thus we 
have 𝜎 ⋅ ℎ푢−푠푘푢⋅푐푢푛푢=2 푑1 = ℎ1푠푘1 푐1⋅푑1  = ℎ1푠푘1 푐1⋅푑1 푚표푑 푝 = ℎ1푠푘1  
Hence, after solving Equation (8), the adversary can 
efficiently compute ℎ1푠푘1  for randomly chosen 𝑔, 𝑔푠푘1  and ℎ1. 
This implies that solving Equation (8) is as hard as solving the 
CDH problem. 
In summary, we can conclude that our proposed 
aggregated signature gossip protocol is correct and secure. 
b) Computational Complexity 
The aggregated signature gossip algorithm requires each 
guardian node to validate the correctness of the combined 
signatures from its neighbors (Line 6 in Algorithm 1) using 
Formula (4). At first glance, it appears that for each signature 
validation, the node needs to perform O(n) pairing 
calculations, i.e.,  𝑒 ℎ푢, 𝑝𝑘푢  for u = 1, 2, …, n, where n is the 
number of guardian nodes. However, we note that these 
pairing results are reusable for other signatures for the same 
checkpoint. Thus, only O(n) pairing calculations are necessary 
for finalizing each checkpoint block. These pairing results can 
even be pre-computed since both ℎ푢  and 𝑝𝑘푢  can both be 
derived from the blockchain data available locally. Then, for 
each signature validation using Formula (4), the node only 
needs to raise each 𝑒 ℎ푢, 𝑝𝑘푢  to a relatively small power 𝑐푢 
(see the next section on the analysis on 𝑐푢), and then multiply 
the results together. On a modern processor, a pairing 
computation can be done within a couple of milliseconds. 
Thus, computing the required pairings for thousands of nodes 
takes only a few seconds. Hence, signature validation is not a 
bottleneck for block finalization, as the finalization time is 
designed to be in the order of minutes. 
c) Messaging Complexity 
The aggregated signature gossip protocol runs for L 
iterations, which is in the order of O(log(n)), where n is the 
number of guardian nodes. In each iteration, the guardian 
needs to send message 𝜎푖, 𝑐푖  to all its neighbor nodes. 
Depending on the network topology, typically it is reasonable 
to assume that for an average node, the number of neighboring 
nodes is a constant (i.e. the number of neighbors does not grow 
as the total number of nodes grows). Hence the number of 
messages a node needs to send/receive to finalize a checkpoint 
is in the order of O(log(n)), which is much better than the O(n) 
complexity in the naive all-to-all signature broadcasting 
implementation. We do acknowledge that each message 
between two neighboring guardians contains an n dimensional 
signer vector 𝑐푖, where each entry of 𝑐푖 is an integer smaller 
than prime p. Below we will present a theoretical model for 
the messaging complexity, which shows that this vector can 
be represented rather compactly since most of its entries are 
small integers (≪ 𝑝). 
To model the message size, we would need to introduce 
the following notations. First, we define vector 𝑥푘,푡, which is 
composed of the kth element of the signer vector 𝑐푗 that each 
guardian node possesses in iteration t 𝑥푘,푡 = 𝑐1푘,푡, 𝑐2푘,푡, … , 𝑐푛푘,푡 푇  
As a special case, initially when t = 0, 𝑥푘,0 =0, 0, … , 1, … , 0 푇  where only the kth element is 1. We also 
define matrix 𝛀 which represents the connectivity among the 
guardian nodes. 𝛀 = 𝛿푖푗 푛×푛 
where 𝛿푖푗 = 1  only when i = j, or node i and node j are 
neighbors (i.e., there is a direct TCP socket connection 
between node i and node j). Otherwise 𝛿푖푗 = 0. 
It can be shown that in Algorithm 1, if we do not break the 
loop (i.e. remove Line 4), the following equation holds 𝑥푘,푡 = 𝛀 ⋅ 𝑥푘,푡−1 
Thus we have 𝑥푘,푡 = 𝛀𝑡 ⋅ 𝑥푘,0 
We know that if det 𝛀 ≠ 0 , matrix 𝛀  always has an 
eigendecomposition 
𝛀 = 𝑽 𝜆푖 푛×푛𝑽 −1 
where 𝜆푖 푛×푛  is an 𝑛×𝑛  matrix whose diagonal are the 
eigenvalues, and the non-diagonal elements are all zero. 
Hence we have 𝑥푘,푡 = 𝑽 𝜆𝑖 𝑛×𝑛𝑡 𝑽−1 ⋅ 𝑥푘,0 
This indicates that the biggest entry of   𝑥푘,푡, and hence the 
signer vectors, is in the order of 𝜆푚푎푥푡 , where 𝜆%&'  is the 
biggest eigenvalue of the connectivity matrix. Although at 
first glance, the entries increase exponentially, we note that 
Algorithm 1 runs only for O(logn) iterations. Thus it can be 
shown that the biggest entries is in the order of O(n) , which 
can be represented with O(logn) bits. 
Notice that in the above analysis, we assumed Line 4 in 
Algorithm 1 is removed. With Line 4, a guardian node stops 
aggregating signature and signer vectors after its current 
signature contains shares from more than 2/3 of all guardians. 
This can further reduce the bits required to represent the signer 
vectors. 
To get a more concrete idea of the messaging complexity, 
let us work out an example. Assume that we pick a 170-bit 
long prime number p for the BLS signature, which can provide 
security comparable to that of a 1024-bit RSA signature. And 
there are 1000 guardian nodes in total. Under this setting, 𝑐푖 
can be naively represented with about twenty kilobytes 
without any compression. However, since most of the entries 
of  𝑐푖 are in the order of O(n) (i.e. roughly 1000), which is far 
smaller than p, 𝑐푖  can be compressed very effectively to a 
couple kilobytes long. Plus the aggregated signature, the size 
of each message is typically in the kilobytes range. Moreover, 
if we assume on average a guardian connects to 20 other 
guardians, then L can be as small as 5 (more than twice of 
log20(1000) = 2.3). This means finalizing one checkpoint just 
requires a guardian to send/receive around 100 messages 
to/from its neighbors, each about a couple kilobytes long. The 
next Experimental Results section will provide more data 
points. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We have implemented a simulator in Python to simulate 
the behavior of the guardian network, and have conducted 
various experiments to evaluate the messaging complexity of 
the checkpoint block finalization process. To setup the 
simulation, we note that in a production blockchain, typically 
when a guardian node joins the network, it first connects to a 
few seed nodes. These seed nodes then send a list of candidate 
peer nodes to the new node, and the new node randomly 
selects a subset to connect to. This process continues until the 
maximum neighbor count is reached. In our experiments, we 
generated random graphs to simulate the connections among 
the guardian nodes following this process. 
We have simulated guardian networks with 1000, 2000, 
and 3000 nodes under different settings with byzantine node 
ratio ranges from 0% to 30%. These byzantine nodes either 
send their neighbors fake signatures, or send out no signature.  
Table I and Table II summarize the experimental results. 
Table I is for the scenario where each guardian node has 20 
neighboring nodes on average. The simulation results for the 
30 neighboring nodes case are provided in Table II.  
 
TABLE I.  MESSAGING COMLEXITY SIMULATION (AVG(|NB|) = 20) 
 
TABLE II.  MESSAGING COMLEXITY SIMULATION (AVG(|NB|) = 30) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The column n represents the total number of guardian 
nodes, column byz is the percentage of byzantine nodes, and 
column max entry provides the biggest entry of 𝑐푖 among all 
guardian nodes upon convergence. Here convergence means 
each honest guardian node receives an aggregated signature 
with shares from more than 2/3 of all nodes. In other words, 
the checkpoint is finalized. Since the messages among the 
guardian nodes are dominated by 𝑐푖, the biggest entry of 𝑐푖 
determines the size of the messages.  
These results are also visualized in Figure 1 and Figure 2, 
where the y-axis represents the max entry, and the x-axis is the 
percentage of byzantine nodes. The three lines in different 
colors plot the trends of the max entry versus byzantine 
percentage for 1000, 2000, and 3000 guardian nodes, 
respectively.  
From the simulation result, under most settings, the 
biggest entry of 𝑐푖 of all guardian nodes generally increases as 
the percentage of byzantine nodes becomes larger. However, 
in most cases, it is less than 1024. This means that each entry 
of the signer vector  𝑐푖  can be represented by 10 bits. In many 
cases, the biggest entry is less than 256, and thus can be 
represented with a single byte. In any case, even with a couple 
thousand guardian nodes, the size of each messages is just a 
couple kilobytes (the number of entries in a signer vector is 
the same as the number of guardian nodes). 
Finally, we observed that the simulation converges very 
quickly. In all of our simulations, the process terminated 
within 5 iterations. This is in the order of O(logbn), where b is 
the average neighboring nodes of each guardian. Since each 
guardian has 20 to 30 neighbors, this means each honest 
guardian node only needs to send/receive 100 to 150 messages 
in total to reach consensus for a checkpoint block, even when 
there are 30% byzantine nodes in the network. Thus, each 
checkpoint block finalization would only take a couple of 
minutes to complete. This indicates our proposed aggregated 
signature gossip protocol is very practical and robust even 
with a high percentage byzantine nodes. 
V. REMARKS 
Firstly, we would like to point out that the multi-level BFT 
frameworks can be applied for both permissioned blockchains 
and permissionless blockchains. In the permissioned chain 
setting, each node (be it a validator or guardian) may have the 
same voting power, and block finalization requires signatures 
from more than 2/3 of all guardian nodes. Also as mentioned 
earlier, techniques like “cryptographic sortion” and “threshold 
relay” from Algorand and DFINITY can be borrowed for 
electing and rotating the validator committee. In the 
permissionless setting, any node can become a guardian by 
staking a certain amount of tokens above the required 
minimum. Voting power of a node is proportional to the 
amount of tokens it staked. 
Next, we also would like to provide a more detailed 
comparison with ByzCoin and OmniLedger. 
1) We note that our aggregated signature gossip protocol 
is more robust than ByzCoin and OmniLedger in the presence 
of byzantine nodes. ByzCoin uses a single leader (i.e. the 
current block producer) to form the communication tree. With 
a tree topology, the root leader could become a single point of 
failure. Even when the leader is not faulty, if an intermediate 
node close to the root node is byzantine, the leader might not 
be able to collect sufficient number of signature shares. In 
 Setting 1 Setting 2 Setting 3 Setting 4 
n 
 byz 
max 
entry byz 
max 
entry byz 
max 
entry byz 
max 
entry 
1000 0% 125 10% 116 20% 103 30% 473 
2000 0% 112 10% 104 20% 445 30% 1053 
3000 0% 108 10% 453 20% 817 30% 1278 
 Setting 1 Setting 2 Setting 3 Setting 4 
n 
 byz 
max 
entry byz 
max 
entry byz 
max 
entry byz 
max 
entry 
1000 0% 161 10% 166 20% 153 30% 139 
2000 0% 161 10% 143 20% 135 30% 376 
3000 0% 146 10% 142 20% 132 30% 675 
Figure 1. Messaging complexity simulation results for case where 
Avg(|Nb|) = 20 
Figure 2. Messaging complexity simulation results for case where 
Avg(|Nb|) = 30 
such cases, ByzCoin falls back to the direct communication 
approach (i.e. the star topology), where the leader has to take 
O(n) time to ask each node for their signature. OmniLedger 
proposed an improvement to ByzCoinX which uses a two-
level tree to improve the tolerance to byzantine nodes [16].  
Yet it still requires the "protocol leader" to coordinate the 
nodes into a communication tree — the protocol leader is in 
charge of selecting the group leaders, which are responsible 
for managing the communication with their own group 
members. If any group leader is a byzantine node, it can be 
replaced by the protocol leader. While being more robust to 
byzantine faults, this approach still seems to rely on the 
protocol leader, which could still be a single point of failure. 
Moreover, the two-level leader structure might add extra 
coordination and communication complexity to the protocol. 
In comparison, our gossip based protocol is leaderless. Even 
with a high number of byzantine nodes, the signature share of 
a node will propagate to most of the honest nodes in O(log n) 
time, similar to message gossiping. 
2) Our aggregated signature gossip scheme is much 
simpler to implement. The CoSi protocol used by ByzCoin 
and OmniLedger is based on the Schnorr signature 
aggregation, which is an interactive protocol. In particular, in 
order to generate an aggregated Schnorr-signature for a 
message, all the singers need to collaborate to generate a 
shared challenge string (i.e. 𝑐 = 𝐻 𝑉0||𝑆  in the "Challenge" 
phase of the CoSi protocol [15]). The challenge string is 
required for each signer to generate its signature share. Hence, 
a leader is required to orchestrate the whole process, and the 
protocol needs to take multiple rounds.  In comparison, our 
proposed protocol is based on the non-interactive BLS 
signature aggregation scheme, which eliminates the need for 
coordination among the nodes. Moreover, instead of the 
communication tree, we use the gossip protocol to propagate 
the aggregated signatures. These lead to a simple and robust 
design which could be easier to implement in practice. 
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